Al-Qaeda steadily reared a new generation of commanders
committed to its ideology, and succeeded in cultivating people
like Sirajuddin Haqqani and Ziaur Rahman. One task remained,
however, and that was to preserve Al-Qaeda’s soul and transform
it to a new body for Al-Qaeda’s mission to move the struggle up
a level. The task of the preservation of Al-Qaeda’s soul and its
transformation under a new dispensation was delicate and complex.
Al-Qaeda’s ultimate aim was to establish an Islamic system under
a Caliphate, but it was not an Islamic enforcement movement.
Al-Qaeda was a resistance movement against Western hegemony that
expected Islamic movements and the Muslim liberation movements
around the world to forge a common front instead of fighting
independently. This was the basic disagreement between Al-Qaeda
and the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Qaeda’s al-Zawahiri believed that
until Western influence was wiped out from the Muslim world and
the institutions of Muslim countries were rid of this influence, the
Shariah would never prevail.
Al-Zawahiri drew his inspiration from the founder of the Muslim
Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Banna (assassinated in 1949) who had
promoted Islamic values in Egypt in 1930s and 1940s, but with
the particular perspective of resistance against British colonialism.
Al-Zawahiri was also inspired by another Muslim Brotherhood
ideologue, Syed Qutb (also slain: he was hanged in 1966), who
saw Western society as Jahilliya (the state of ignorance of guidance
from God) and demanded a complete disconnect with the traits
and behavior of Western society for an Islamic revolution to bring
forward Islamists as rulers.
Al-Qaeda often cites the example of Saudi Arabia, where Islamic
laws are enforced, but the country is still a slave to Western
designs and interests. Al-Qaeda aimed at the revival of a resistance
movement across the Muslim world against Western hegemony,
and in the process the negation of organizations like the Jamaat-e-
Islami Pakistan, the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East, and
the Islamic Court Union in Somalia, as well as the Hezbul Islami
Al-Iraqi, since although these organizations were the so-called flag
bearers of Islam, they were, in fact, major forces maintaining the
status quo. They survived as a result of a compromise with state
institutions and forces working as Western proxies in the Muslim
world to safeguard Western interests in Muslim countries. Similarly,
Al-Qaeda feels that armies in so-called Muslim countries are there
to defend Western interests, and it brands the institution of armies
in the Muslim world as the most lethal Western tool against
Islamization. Hamas and the Islamic Jihad are similarly categorized
as they go along with the arrangements that come under interna-
tional laws interpreted by the West. Al-Qaeda strives to break the
West’s hold over Muslim armed forces and West’s domination over
world politics and trade.
Before 9/11 Al-Qaeda did raise a generation like Khalid Sheikh
Mohammad, who was master strategist on sabotage and terror
activities, but it did not have any person with the experience to
operate high-profile insurgencies. Al-Qaeda had allies like Gulbaddin
Hikmatyar, but they had independent policies and thinking. It was
possible that these allies would temporarily endorse Al-Qaeda’s
cause and operations, but there was always the risk they would
choose a solo flight at a critical juncture.
Al-Qaeda was looking for a person who was a master of guerrilla
warfare with a global perspective, someone able to think over and
above his own personal interests. Once again a crisis in the Kashmiri
militants’ camp provided it with an opportunity to benefit and to
breathe its soul into a new order. This came with the attack on the
former Pakistani President Musharraf in late 2003, which resulted
in a massive crackdown on the militants fighting for the right for
self-determination of Indian Kashmir. During the course of investiga-
tions, any shred of doubt about a person was enough to nail anybody
connected with Jihadi circles, no matter how well connected he was
with Pakistan’s military establishment. The supreme commander of
Jaish-e-Mohammad, Abdullah Shah Mazhar, was one of the people
picked by the ISI when it found a person by the name of Asif Chotu
financing the attack. Asif had once been a member of Jaish-e-
Mohammad. He later joined Al-Qaeda. Abdullah Shah Mazhar gave
me this account of his days in detention:
I was picked up from Karachi and taken in a vehicle. The last
building I saw was the Sultan Mosque in the Defense Housing
Authority. After that I was blindfolded and taken to a bungalow.
I was offered good food and treated with all good manners. I was
asked few questions about Asif and how much I knew of him,
and my possible involvement in attacking General Musharraf.
I told them categorically that although Asif and I had studied
together in a madrassa, I knew nothing of his activities, and
nor was I involved in his purported plot to assassinate General
Musharraf. The military officer told me that I had three days to
think, after which he would hand me over to people who would
not be nice to me. My answer remained the same: I had no idea
what Asif Chotu had been up to.
Abdullah said that in next three days he was shifted to another
location which was a military barracks:
Nobody came to see me except for a person who used to give
me food and water. Then one day I was taken to the airport and
to another city, possibly Lahore. There I was not asked a single
question. They simply hanged me from the roof as a butcher hangs
a chicken before slaughter – my hands and legs were tied together
with a rope and I was strung up to a roof. Each muscle and bone
of the body cried with pain. After an hour they pulled me down
and then took off my shalwar (Pakistani trousers) and beat me
on my hips with a thin cane. Each hit of the cane ripped off my
skin. Throughout this time nobody spoke to me. When I was near
unconscious, I was shifted to a small cell. After a few hours a man
came, slid the small window in the door open, and asked me to
give him my hand. I gave my hand and he put some ointment into
it and told me to spread the ointment over my wounds.
Abdullah said that after this there was a brief interrogation
session, then he was left in isolation. He was given a chamber
pot to use as a toilet. After six months he was declared innocent.
A brigadier came to him and tendered his apology for the harsh
treatment. He offered monetary compensation, which Abdullah
refused with thanks. Abdullah then returned to Karachi and
became engaged in routine work, without any thought of revenge.
But there were other people like Ibne Amin (real name Bin
Yameen) from Swat who were detained in the same detention
cells and refused to forget the vicious treatment meted out
to them. Ibne Amin later became the most influential Taliban
commander in the Swat Valley.
Another person, who, unlike Mazhar, adopted the path of
defiance against the state of Pakistan was Commander Muhammad
Ilyas Kashmiri. His name still terrifies the Indian military establish-
ment. Among the guerrilla commanders of today’s world nobody has
attained the type of success Kashmiri had as a field commander. His
track record and his complete submission to Al-Qaeda impressed the
Al-Qaeda leaders. He was quickly included in Al-Qaeda’s Shura and
later given command of Al-Qaeda’s operations. This was Al-Qaeda’s
turning point. Al-Qaeda was now able to operate independently.
It gathered together commanders like Qari Ziaur Rahman and
Sirajuddin Haqqani, and its soul shifted into a new organization,
Laskhar al-Zil. Its best brains, men like Haroon and Ziaur Rahman,
were members of Laskhar al-Zil.
This was the beginning for the next phase of war in Afghanistan,
for which the Western coalition forces were prepared and ready to
send thousands of fresh soldiers. This was the phase in which India
was preparing to support the Western coalition in Afghanistan.
It was also the phase when it was intended that, under immense
pressure from the West, Pakistan would wage an all-out war against
the militants.
Thus begins another story from the Al-Qaeda One Thousand
and One Nights tales. In this phase, although Afghanistan remained
the central front, Al-Qaeda decided to plan its revival in Iraq and
open up new fronts to conclusively engage Western resources. As in
the earlier strategy it had successfully applied in Pakistan of taking
advantage of a situation and splitting the Islamists to bring them
into its cadre, Al-Qaeda now gathered former officers from the
Iraqi Republican Guard, together with Islamists from Yemen and
Somalia, to march towards its new goal.