BACK TO BASE

As dozens of body bags containing the remains of NATO soldiers
were ferried back to their home countries in the West, news of
the Taliban and Al-Qaeda’s revival pointed directly at the two
Waziristans as the primary conduit for the Taliban having re-emerged
in Afghanistan to play havoc with the US–NATO-led war machine.
The United States now had to come up with a plan to counter the
Taliban advance on the Pakistani side of the border. When the news
came that renewed pressure was being piled on Pakistan to carry
out a military operation in the Pakistani tribal areas, a grand tribal
council was called in Miranshah, the tribal headquarters of North
Waziristan. It was conceded that the militants could not fight on all
fronts. They needed to call a truce with Pakistan until the emergence
of their next plan.
“I can see slit throats beneath these turbans and beards,” were
the words of Hajaj bin Yusuf, an eighth-century tyrant in what
is now Iraq, as he witnessed a gathering of leading religious and
political figures. A similar thought occurred to this writer in August
2006 when he attended the largest-ever gathering of the Pakistani
Taliban, tribal elders, and politicians in Miranshah, the tribal capital
of North Waziristan. Fire and blood were in the air as momentous
events loomed over the tribal areas of North and South Waziristan, where the Taliban were in complete control. The militants’ decision
to reach a peace agreement with the Pakistani government was not
meant to promote peace in any real sense, but was another strategic
mode of engagement until the next war plan was finalized.
To confront the immediate threat, the militants were asked to stay
in the background under a strategy that called upon local political
leaders belonging to the pro-Taliban Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam5 to
come to the fore. In the tribal council meeting the militants were
not allowed to speak and were instead relegated to the backbenches.
The militants agreed to stop all hostilities against Pakistan’s armed
forces, and the peace agreement was signed in September 2006.
However, much like previous moves, this too was a lull before a
storm.
This time, a pact was signed between the Pakistan government,
represented by the political agent, the Uthmanzai tribe and tribal
leaders, and the religious leaders of North Waziristan. It had 16
clauses and 4 sub-clauses.
The major points included:
A. The Uthmanzai Wazirs, including the local Taliban, religious
leaders, elders, and tribesmen undertook that:

1. There would be no attacks on law-enforcement agencies and
   government property. There would be no targeted killings.
2. There would be no parallel administration established and the
   government’s writ would stand. In case of any problem, the
   political administration would resolve the issue in consultation
   with the Uthmanzai tribes, according to traditions and customs
   and the FCR ordinance.
3. There would be no cross-border military activities inside Afghani-
   stan. However, there would be no restriction on border crossings

for the purposes of trade/business and meeting relatives according
to the local riwaj (traditions).

4. There would not be any kind of terrorist activities in the adjacent
   districts of North Waziristan.
5. All foreigners residing in North Waziristan would either leave
   Pakistan or remain peacefully according to the prevailing laws
   and current agreement. The aforementioned clauses would apply
   stringently to all foreigners.
6. All captured government property during the operation in the
   shape of vehicles, weapons, wireless, etc. would be returned.
   B. The government undertaking included:

All those apprehended during the operation would be released
and not be arrested again on previous charges.

2. The government would release all political benefits.
3. The government would remove all newly established checkpoints
   on roads and post Levies and Khasadars on the old checkpoints,
   as in the past.
4. The government would return all vehicles and other items such as
   weapons captured during the operation.
5. After the agreement had been signed the government would stop
   all land/air operations and issues would be resolved according to
   custom and traditions.
6. The government would pay compensation for all collateral
   damage to those affected.
7. According to tribal traditions there would be no restrictions on
   carrying weapons. However, restrictions would continue to be
   imposed on heavy weapons.
8. The implementation of the agreement would start with withdrawal of the army from the checkposts to the barracks.

C. Miscellaneous:

1. According to the agreement, a ten-member committee would be

established, comprising ulema (scholars)/elders and representatives of the political administration. The committee would be responsible for:
a. establishing links between the government and the Utmanzai
tribes
b. reviewing and ensuring the implementation of the agreement.

2. If anyone or any group (foreigners or local) did not abide by the
   agreement and disrupted peace in Waziristan, action would be
   taken against him or them.
   Unlike the previous agreements, this agreement was devoid of any
   mention of words like mujahideen or Taliban, and although the
   agreement was signed by the leading Pakistani military commanders,
   Hafiz Gul Bahadar, Maulana Sadiq Noor, and Maulana Abdul
   Khaliq, it was basically an accord between the government and
   the Utmanzai Wazir. This was done because the militants wanted
   to show the United States that any new military operations on
   their territory were unnecessary as the tribal leaders had taken
   responsibility for peace.
   As a result of this peace agreement an unknown amount of money
   was transferred from Pakistani government coffers to the militants;

the clinical term “foreigners” was used to indicate Al-Qaeda and
other foreign militants; and some 100 Taliban and Al-Qaeda men,
ranging from commanders to footsoldiers, were released from
Pakistani custody. During the signing ceremony of the agreement
in the soccer stadium of Miranshah, the militants provided security
cover, while Al-Qaeda’s black flag (al Rayah) was fluttering over the
stadium scoreboard.
The peace deal broke down on May 20, 2007 as the United States
was pressurizing Pakistan to conduct operations against the militants
and the militants were finalizing their new war plan. The strategy
that had started after 9/11 and extended to South Waziristan, then
on to Helmand, now saw a move up to the next level of war. As both
the US and Pakistani security apparatus looked to wage a military
operation in Pakistan’s tribal areas, the militants turned their eyes
towards Pakistan’s cities. And by the end of 2007, the theater of war
had expanded from Peshawar to Karachi.