Al-Qaeda’s objective in undertaking the Mumbai 26/11 attack
was to provoke a war between Pakistan and India. All hostilities
between the military and the militants would then come to a halt
in the Swat Valley in Pakistan’s NWFP, as well as in the tribal areas
of Bajaur, Mohmand, and the two Waziristans. Pakistan’s militant
leaders Mullah Fazlullah and Baitullah Mehsud announced that they
would fight alongside Pakistan’s armed forces in an India–Pakistan
war, and the director general of ISI, Lt.-Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha,
confirmed this understanding in his briefing to national and foreign
correspondents, when he called Fazlullah and Baitullah Mehsud
Pakistan’s strategic assets.
The stage was all set to change the dynamics of enmity and friend-
ship in the region when Washington put its foot down. Washington
hurriedly sent several officials to India and Pakistan to advise their
governments that any war between them would only benefit the
militants. Washington assured India that Pakistan would cooperate
fully in the investigation of the Mumbai attacks and arrest those
who had been responsible for their planning.
Watching his plan fail, Haroon advised Rahman to use another
approach for the 313 Brigade. LeT structures were now under
siege because of US pressure on Pakistan, and hence of little value.
Rahman journeyed to India again to acquire more information
and photograph sensitive installations. These included India’s
nuclear research laboratories in Mumbai and Hyderabad. He also
took photographs of the National Defense College, India’s parlia-
ment building, and some other high-profile government offices in
Delhi. Rahman always drew up a contingency plans for assaults
on different targets. In this case, if the militants were unable to
hit India’s National Defense College during the day when several
senior military officials were present, they were to attack the Indian
parliament.
Rahman was arrested after a 313 Brigade militant, Zahid Iqbal,
was picked up by the ISI in Islamabad on July 2009 and identified
him. But as he had not been involved in any terrorist act in Pakistan,
he was released and soon back at work planning the sabotage
operation in India using the 313 Brigade. However, information was
leaked to the FBI before he could proceed with the action, and the
entire team, including Rahman, was captured.
In October 2009 a conspiracy was unearthed in Chicago by the
FBI. Two suspects were arrested, David Headley and Tahawwur
Rana. Their interrogations revealed that they had been planning
to attack the National Defense College in Delhi and India’s
nuclear facilities. The Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which
had published allegedly blasphemous cartoons featuring the Holy
Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him), was also on the hit list. The conspira-
tors all belonged to the Kashmiri group. Their affidavit exposed the
roles of Major Haroon and his aide Abdul Rahman in the recruit-
ment and orientation process.
Kashmiri was optimistic about giving India a far bigger jolt than
the 26/11 attack on Mumbai when I interviewed him on October
9, 2009 (see Asia Times Online, October 15, 2009). “So should
the world expect more Mumbai-like attacks?” I asked. “That was
nothing compared to what we have planned for the future,” he
replied.
Extracts from the FBI’s affidavit
After visiting Denmark in January 2009 [David] Headley
traveled to Pakistan to meet with Individual A. During this
trip, Headley traveled with Individual A to the Federally
Administered Tribal Area (FATA) region in north-west Pakistan
and met with (Ilyas) Kashmiri. Headley returned to Chicago
in mid-June 2009. Following Headley’s return from Pakistan,
Headley communicated by email with Laskhar-e-Taiba Member
A regarding the status of the Northern Project. Because Laskhar-
e-Taiba Member A responded that he had “new investment
plans,” coded language for the planning of a different attack,
Headley and Individual A began to focus on working with
Kashmiri to complete the attack on the newspaper. In late July
2009, Headley traveled again to Copenhagen, Denmark, and to
other locations in Europe. When Headley returned to the United
States, he told a Customs and Border Patrol inspector that he
was traveling on business as a representative of an immigra-
tion business. Headley’s luggage contained no papers or other
Shahzad02 maintext.indd 97 3/21/2011 9:58:48 AM
98 inside a l -q a e da a n d t h e ta l i ba n
documents relating to such business. Following Headley’s return
to Chicago in August 2009, Headley used coded language to
inquire of Individual A on multiple occasions whether Individual
A had been in touch with Kashmiri regarding planning for the
attack. Headley expressed concern that Individual A’s commu-
nications with Kashmiri had been cut off.
In early September 2009, Individual A called Headley
to report that Kashmiri might be dead. Headley expressed
dismay and concern, and said that Kashmiri’s death means
“our company has gone into bankruptcy then,” and that “the
projects and so forth will go into suspension.” Shortly after
initial press reports that Kashmiri had been killed in a drone
attack in Pakistan, Headley and Individual A had a series of
coded conversations in which they discussed the reports of
Kashmiri’s death and the significance of Kashmiri’s death for the
projects they were planning. Individual A sought to reassure and
encourage Headley, telling him, among other things, that “This
is business sir; these types of things happen.”
According to the affidavit, Headley also talked about A’s friend
“Harry.” A was Major Abdul Rahman, who was in charge of the
India cell, and Harry, his friend, was Major Haroon.
ARREST
Before the arrest of Rahman, Haroon had approached his LeT and
army friends. He convinced them to take part in the battle against
NATO in Afghanistan. He took them to the Pakistani tribal areas
and trained them in modern guerrilla warfare. In a matter of a few
years the 313 Brigade came to be held in high regard in Jihadi circles
for its expertise and resourcefulness. However, as more missions
appeared on the horizon, more resources were required.
Money had always been lacking for the war, and Haroon was now
facing a situation in which he did not even have enough money to buy
fuel for his car, let alone pay hotel bills during his travels. To keep going,
he sold his Corolla station wagon and resorted to a modest style of
living. At one point he sold his AK-47 silencers in the Dara Adam Khail
market, but even that did not generate enough money. Their monetary
situation forced Haroon and Kashmiri to think of an alternative strategy. This was kidnapping for ransom. However, they would only
abduct non-Muslims. Haroon came to Karachi and contacted an old
army friend, retired Major Abdul Basit. The only help Haroon sought
from Basit was to spy on Satish Anand, a renowned film producer.
Satish is a Hindu, an uncle of the famous Indian actor Johi Chawala
and son of the renowned film distributor Jagdaish Anand. With the
information he had received from Basit, Haroon came back to Karachi
and abducted Satish for ransom, thinking his family to be rich. He
took the film distributor to North Waziristan, only to discover that all
the estimates about his money were wrong. Satish did not have liquid
funds. He owned properties but in captivity he could not sell them.
Satish was told to contact his family members and ask them to raise a
ransom, but it was to no avail.
The abductors then made Satish an offer: they would release him if
he embraced Islam. They did not kill Muslims. Satish embraced Islam
and promised to make a documentary on the militants. It is still a
mystery whether or not any money was paid for his release, and if so
how much, but what is true is that Satish came back safely to Karachi
and refused to register any case against his abductors. He was also
tight- lipped about their identities. Haroon was eventually arrested
in February 2009 in Islamabad while he was trying to abduct Sarwar
Khan, a member of the Qadyani sect. (The Qadyanis are considered
non-Muslims under Pakistan’s constitution.) Several cases, including
the murder of Faisal Alvi, were then lodged against Haroon.
Haroon had served under some leading military officers including
the chairman joint chiefs of the Staff Committee, General Tariq
Majeed (now retired), while his brother Khurram had served under
the director general of ISI, Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha. I am sure that the
Pakistan Army command, who knew of their professional skills,
would miss these two brothers, very much like the Saudi establish-
ment might have missed Osama bin Laden. These are the stories of
Islamists pushed by circumstances onto a particular track, and then
indoctrinated. They then became counterproductive, if not useless,
for Muslim establishments that decide to go along with the US
designs of a new world order in the post-Cold War era.
On March 3, 2009, only a week after Haroon’s arrest in
Islamabad, around ten gunmen attacked a bus carrying the Sri
Lankan cricket team on its way to play in Pakistan’s second city,
Lahore. The pattern of the attack suggested that the attackers had
no intention of killing the cricketers, as they sprayed bullets only on
the escorting policemen. When the policemen fled, the gunmen tried
to hijack the bus. This was prevented by the bus driver who kept his
wits about him and drove the vehicle past the gunmen to safety. Six
of the policemen escorting the team bus were killed, and seven crick-
eters and an assistant coach were injured in the attempted hijack.
Rocket launchers and grenades were left on the site of shooting, as
were water bottles and dried fruit. Officials said the incident bore
similarities to the deadly November attacks in Mumbai. ISI claimed
the incident was an action taken by militants trained by Haroon,
and that the intention was to capture the cricketers and hold them
hostage until they could be exchanged for the captive commander.