Three-time former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is fast finding a foothold in the political mine-field controlled by the powerful Pakistan military. He certainly wants to throw off the image of being a General’s pug and win. He knows the only way to deal with the Generals in Rawalpindi is to flex his muscles which he is known to, most often at heavy cost to himself and his ambitions in the past.
The only issue is how far will the Generals put up with him? This is where Nawaz Sharif seems to have found a secret cache of political insight in the heavily turgid waters of contemporary Pakistani politics.
But before making a guess at Sharif’s secret potion which is driving him to take risks so early in the electoral race, it is useful to look at what he has been saying in the recent past.
Two things are clear. First and foremost he is telling the Generals there is a limit to what they can expect from him. Second, he knows it is the people who matter in the end howsoever powerful a General and his cronies might imagine themselves to be. The trick is in muscling into space which Imran Khan and his party are forced to vacate by the Generals. Sharif knows there is no chance of Khan coming into the good books of General Asim Munir; the animosity is too strong. Khan could come back later, as has been the story of Pakistan politics, but not in 2024. His chance is put himself and his party in the space left by PTI and his boss, Imran Khan.
Here too, Sharif has realised a few truths. Khan is popular for his strident stand against the military and his supporters are mostly young and driven by social media. His party has committed considerable resources to beat the odds in the social media race, although it is a bit amateurish at the moment–remember the pigeons fluttering around him in the Lahore meeting.
On the army, Sharif has chosen to be a little more crafty. He is taking on the past Generals, carefully avoiding any reference to the present dispensation in Rawalpindi. Two statements of his are noteworthy. His question about why he was removed for opposing the Kargil conflict and why a novice (read Imran Khan) was placed in Islamabad to ruin the country. These are serious questions. General Pervez Musharraf’s misadventure in Kargil was disastrous for Pakistan.Not only did the country lose soldiers but also prestige. It was a foolhardy move on the part of the army which caused the country heavily and Nawaz Sharif his premiership twice–first in a coup by Musharraf and then an engineered ouster by General Qamar Javed Bajwa. The Kargil question is still touchy for the army and Sharif has taken a calculated risk in ruffling the feathers.
His statement on Imran Khan taking over as the Prime Minister also targets the army for letting it happen. He was certainly referring to the Generals and their political allies for bringing country to this point, they should also be held accountable. They should be asked how you meted out such treatment with this country. Sharif knows he is playing with fire–even though Bajwa and his ISI chief, Lt. General Faiz Hameed, were largely responsible for bringing Imran Khan to Islamabad, General Asim Munir was very much in the know of the army’s plan to oust Sharif in 2017-2018. A month after Imran Khan became the Prime Minister, Munir was made the ISI chief. Sharif therefore is not even sparing Munir in his attack.
Another point of contention could be India. Like at the Lahore rally early this year, Sharif once again insisted on building better relationships with India–His question that two Indian Prime Ministers (both BJP) visited Pakistan during his tenures is a telling remark. After one year of being in the seat, Munir has not shown any inclination to renew talks with India. In fact, he has kept the kettle boiling without letting it boil over, a clear sign that taking on India was not his priority. Two more critical and urgent issues are on Munir’s plate–Afghanistan and elections. Sharif, being a veteran politician, knows for sure Munir’s hand–after making Imran Khan a staunch enemy, the army has limited choices–either PMLN or PPP. Sharif knows that the only way to push PPP on the margins is to find a middle ground with the army.
Sharif, now that he is back home, must have garnered enough inputs to realise that Munir is still struggling to find a secure place in Rawalpindi–there are too many adversaries within the tent, and outside. After one year of tenure, Munir is still to notch a point or two in his favour–Afghanistan Taliban has become a headache, TTP is gaining lethal influence and needs help from the US, economy is still in coma and requires Chinese balm, and on top of it political scenario at home remain as open as ever and there are other equally compelling tasks in his inbox.
In many ways, this is the start of an interesting Sharif-Munir play. Sharif has told Munir that he is in the game.