Arsenal and Missile Types
Arsenal Size
Estimated stockpile: 165 nuclear warheads. Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are believed to be in central storage facilities in the southern part of the country.
Continues to produce HEU and plutonium for its nuclear weapons program.
Key Delivery Systems
Nuclear-capable aircraft: U.S.-built and supplied F-16A/B, and French-manufactured Mirage V. Pakistan has modified both for nuclear weapons delivery.
The U.S granted permission to Pakistan for the upgrade of their F-16s.
Operational ballistic missiles: short-range Abdali (Hatf-2), Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), Shaheen-I (Hatf-4), and medium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5), Shaheen-II (Hatf-6). The dual-capable Nasr (Hatf-9) is a short-range missile intended for battlefield use.
Operational cruise missiles: ground-launched Babur (Haft-7) and the air-launched Ra’ad (Haft-8)
In testing: The Shaheen 1A, a ballistic missile with a range of 900 km and the Shaheen 3 ballistic missile (range: 2750 km) were successfully test launched in December 2015. The Shaheen 3 is designed to “reach Indian islands” so India cannot use them as “strategic bases.” The newest medium-range ballistic missile under development, which has been described as capable of carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), is the Ababeel (range: 2,200km). The Ababeel is a three-stage, solid-fueled missile. This missile has yet to be deployed operationally, and there are doubts if it is still an important part of Pakistan’s missile arsenal.
Cruise missiles with an unknown deployment status include the ground-launched Baber-2 (range: 700km) and the sea-based Babur-3 (range: 450km). The air-launched Ra’ad-2 (range: >350km) was revealed in March 2017.
In August 2021 Pakistan test fired the Ghaznavi SRBM. Pakistani officials said that this lauch reaffirmed the technology of the Ghaznavi system, first developed in 2004 based off of the Chinese DF-11.
Pakistan continues to develop new multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRV) to combat India’s missile defense systems.
Capabilities and Developments
Estimated Destructive Power
Unknown, likely over two megatons
Estimated Military Fissile Material Stockpiles
Plutonium stockpile: Estimated 0.5 tons.
Weapons-grade HEU: estimated 4 ± 1.2 tons
Estimated to have enough fissile material for more than 200 weapons
Pakistan is moving away from solely HEU-based weapons to lighter and more compact plutonium core warheads
Able to produce 150kg of HEU and 12-24kg plutonium each year
Operates one HEU enrichment facility in Kahuta and a possible second plant at Gadwal.
Operates heavy water plutonium production reactor complex at Khushab, and plutonium reprocessing plant at the New Laboratories facility of the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH).
Commitments and Policies
Disarmament and Commitments to Reduce Arsenal Size
Opposed to signing the NPT. Pakistan will not consider signing the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state as long as India has nuclear weapons.
Future Commitments
Supports negotiation of a non-discriminatory, verifiable Fissile Materials Treaty, but asserts that the treaty should cover existing stocks. Due to the consensus rule governing the Conference on Disarmament, Pakistan has been able to effectively block the start of any negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and will continue to do so until an agreement to include existing stockpiles is added to the treaty.
Supports a direct, comprehensive approach to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and materials within an agreed upon timeframe.
Attended the three Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons—Oslo, March 2013; Nayarit, February 2014, and Vienna, December 2014.
Pakistan joined all other nuclear weapons possessing states in boycotting the 2017 Nuclear Ban Treaty negotiations at the UN General Assembly.
Nuclear Weapons Policies
Nuclear Testing Policy
Has observed nuclear testing moratorium since May 1998. Pakistan renewed its proposal for a bilateral moratorium on testing with India in August 2016.
Party to Partial Test Ban Treaty (banning atmospheric, outer space, and underwater testing)
Opposed to signing Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Use of Nuclear Weapons
Retains first-use policy against nuclear armed states, but has declared a no-first-use policy against non-nuclear weapon states
Continues to adhere to the policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence, asserting it will not enter into an arms race with any other country but remaining aware of evolving security dynamics in South Asia. Has stated its intention to maintain a full spectrum deterrence capability to deter all forms of aggression
Ratified the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement in January 1991
Signed the Lahore Agreement in February 1999 1
Nuclear posture seeks to counter military threats, including Indian non-nuclear attacks on Pakistani territory .
https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/pakistan-nuclear-disarmament/