In calling for a clear, strong, and long-term commitment to the militarydominated government of Pakistan despite serious concerns about that country’s nuclear proliferation activities, The 9/11 Commission cast into sharp relief two longstanding dilemmas concerning U.S. policy towards Pakistan and South Asia. First, in an often strained security relationship spanning more than five decades, U.S. and Pakistani national security objectives have seldom been congruent. Pakistan has
viewed the alliance primarily in the context of its rivalry with India, whereas
American policymakers have viewed it from the perspective of U.S. global security
interests. Second, U.S. nuclear nonproliferation objectives towards Pakistan (and
India) repeatedly have been subordinated to other important U.S. goals. During the
1980s, Pakistan exploited its key role as a conduit for aid to the anti-Soviet Afghan
mujahidin to avoid U.S. nuclear nonproliferation sanctions and receive some $600
million annually in U.S. military and economic aid. Underscoring Pakistan’s
different agenda, some of the radical Islamists favoured by its military intelligence
service later formed the core of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
A crucial U.S. policy challenge is to gain Pakistani cooperation in shutting down
the extensive illicit nuclear supplier network established in the 1990s by the self-designated “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadir Khan, which provided
nuclear enrichment technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea, while at the same
time supporting stability in Pakistan and gaining its maximum cooperation against
terrorism. To date, the Administration appears largely to have acquiesced in
Pakistan’s refusal to allow access to Khan by U.S. intelligence officials. The
Administration has been equally reluctant to publicly criticize the Musharraf
government’s apparent use of international arms dealers to obtain controlled U.S.
dual-use technology for its own nuclear weapons program, in violation of U.S. law.
The 109th Congress has been asked by the Administration to provide some $698
million in military and economic assistance to Pakistan for FY2006, part of a five-year, $3 billion aid package. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern
that, as during the 1980s, the urgent need for Pakistan’s cooperation will prevent the
Administration from dealing forcefully with its nuclear proliferation activities, and
have introduced legislation that seeks to make U.S. assistance contingent on
Pakistan’s cooperation on nuclear proliferation.
This report: (1) briefly recounts previous failed efforts to reconcile American
nuclear nonproliferation and other security objectives regarding Pakistan; (2)
documents A.Q. Khan’s role, whether with or without official involvement, in
supplying nuclear technology to “rogue” states and how these activities escaped
detection by U.S. intelligence agencies; (3) considers issues regarding the objectives,
and viability of the military-dominated government of President Pervez Musharraf;
and, (4) outlines and evaluates several U.S. options for seeking to gain more credible
cooperation from Pakistan’s regarding its nuclear activities while still maintaining
effective counterterrorist cooperation. This report will not be further updated.
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/RL32745.pdf