Written by Seema Khan and Abdul Ghafoor, Stimson Center
A Summary
In the year since Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) supporters stormed military headquarters in Rawalpindi on May 9, public tolerance for the military’s dominance has visibly weakened. The public has increasingly rejected the military’s control over election outcomes, suppression of political dissent, and judicial interference, marking a significant shift from previous political turnovers. In a recent press conference, the Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) labelled PTI’s May 9 protest as anti-state and unforgivable, pointedly avoiding any mention of Imran Khan, the former Prime Minister and PTI leader who is banned from national media. Instead, the DG ISPR repeatedly referred to PTI as the “intashari tola” (anarchist group). He also failed to address pressing concerns raised by PTI leaders, including Khan, about the lack of security in cantonment areas during the protests, Khan’s mistreatment, unlawful detentions, forced disappearances, and civilian trials in military courts. PTI’s Secretary of Information, Raouf Hassan, responded with a press conference that was not aired by the media.
Since Khan’s ousting through a vote of no confidence in 2022, the military’s efforts to suppress PTI’s political activities have been swift and severe. These efforts included arresting PTI workers, enforcing heavy media censorship, social media blackouts, and delaying provincial and general elections unconstitutionally. Censorship and suppression of political and civil liberties under military control are not new in Pakistan, and PTI is not the first party to face such treatment.
May 9 remains a pivotal date in Pakistan’s political history, with the first anniversary underscoring the public’s rejection of military interference in governance. This shift in public attitude suggests a potential change in Pakistan’s political landscape, with growing intolerance for undue interference by the military.
A Pattern of Military Involvement
The military’s response to the May 9 protest follows a familiar pattern of repressing political leaders and parties whose interests conflict with its own. This repression has targeted various groups, including the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, Pakistan People’s Party, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, Baloch nationalist parties, Pashtun political groups, and leaders like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Nawab Akbar Bugti, and Fatimah Jinnah. The military has historically orchestrated or supported anti-government protests led by religious groups to pressure civilian authorities. Examples include the Faizabad Dharna in 2017 and the Islami Jamhoori Itehhad in the 1990s against Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party. In 2018, Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N accused the military of pre-poll rigging and fabricating charges. Journalists were abducted, and media publications were censored in the lead-up to the election, actions widely attributed to the military.
In addition to manipulating public pressure, the military controls national discourse through media censorship. Pakistan frequently experiences unannounced internet disruptions, including a total shutdown of X (formerly Twitter) in April 2024, justified under national security concerns. Civil society decries these actions. Historically, General Zia censored print media, and General Pervez Musharraf suspended news channels during a state of emergency in November 2007. Under Khan’s government, when PML-N was out of favour with the military, Nawaz Sharif’s appearances, speeches, and statements were banned from electronic media.
Military Crackdown Post-May 9 Raises Human Rights Concerns
Post-May 9, familiar military tactics such as enabling protests, intimidating politicians, and rigging elections were used against PTI. The military also utilized the judiciary to bury PTI in legal cases and strip the party of electoral participation.
Crackdown on PTI and its Supporters
Following the May 9 protests, PTI leadership alleged that military men incited riots, instigating crowds and damaging public property, including residences of high-ranking officers. After Khan’s arrest, paramilitary and police forces detained PTI leadership and supporters, often without charges. Women and children were also abducted by “unknowns,” exacerbating fear. The mass arrests and excessive force against peaceful protesters violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the norms of liberal democracies, where dissent and peaceful assembly are protected.
Released political leaders were coerced into denouncing the May 9 protests, praising the military’s sacrifices, and renouncing PTI on national media. The military pardoned those who complied, while those who refused remained jailed. Journalists critical of the military fled Pakistan for safety.
Coercion Through Other Institutions
The military’s direct influence on civil institutions undermines their efficacy. Allegations of pre-polling rigging and disputed election results reflect this decline. While rigged elections are not new, the 2024 elections were particularly contentious, with many parties highlighting discrepancies between initial and final results.
The military also pressured the judiciary. Khan faces nearly 200 cases, with convictions on mostly fabricated charges, including embezzlement and disclosing state secrets. Military trials of civilians for protests are unconstitutional and violate international laws by curbing civilian courts’ jurisdiction.
Resistance to the Military Reveals Deteriorating Institutional Tolerance
Once Pakistan’s most trusted institution, the military’s image has suffered, with public attitudes visibly shifting since May 9. On February 8, 2024, Pakistanis voted overwhelmingly for independent candidates backed by Khan, despite election delays and interference.
Bureaucracy and judiciary, traditionally silent, have shown unusual defiance. The Deputy Commissioner of Rawalpindi admitted election manipulation, and a Ministry of Information officer was suspended for dissent. On March 26, six Islamabad High Court judges alleged military intelligence interference in judicial decisions through surveillance and blackmail. Khan’s legal team disclosed judges’ confessions of agency pressure, with two Supreme Court judges resigning under duress. On May 11, 2023, the Supreme Court ruled Khan’s arrest illegal.
As Pakistan grapples with the aftermath of May 9 and the 2024 elections, it is clear that the public desire for reforming the military’s role in domestic politics, foreign policy, the economy, and governance is strong. The Supreme Court’s decision on the Islamabad High Court judges’ case will test democracy and the rule of law. To regain public trust, Pakistan’s institutions must support civilian supremacy over the military.
May 25,2024
Source: South Asian Voices, Stimsom Center